Philosophical aspects of modern cosmology by Zinkernagel, Henrik
Philosophical aspects of modern cosmology1 
 
Henrik Zinkernagel 
Department of Philosophy I, Campus de Cartuja, 
18071, University of Granada, Spain. 
zink@ugr.es 
 
 
 
Cosmology is the attempt to understand in scientific terms the structure and evolution of 
the universe as a whole. This ambition has been with us since the ancient Greeks, even 
if the developments in modern cosmology have provided a picture of the universe 
dramatically different from that of Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle. The cosmological 
thinking of these figures, e.g. the belief in uniform circular motion of the heavens, was 
closely related to their philosophical ideas, and it shaped the field of cosmology at least 
up to the times of Copernicus and Kepler. 
 
Nowadays it is not uncommon among scientists to question the relevance of philosophy 
for their field. This may be part of a simplified view according to which science is 
mostly about finding the best match between theories and empirical data. However, 
even on such a view one can identify interesting philosophical issues, like 
underdetermination of theories and theoryladenness of data. Moreover, apart from 
matching theory and data, science is often concerned with what the studied theories 
implies for our deeper understanding of the world. This involves the philosophical 
activity of interpreting the theories in question, and philosophy thus continues to be an 
integral part of scientific, including cosmological, thought. One may argue that 
cosmology is even more philosophical than most other sciences, in that it more 
explicitly deals with the limits or horizons of scientific knowledge. In particular, as 
cosmology involves the age-old questions of the possible temporal and spatial limits of 
the universe, it is naturally associated with irresistible speculations of what may cause 
or lie beyond those limits. 
 
In the fall of 2011, the University of Granada hosted an interdisciplinary workshop – 
Philosophical Aspects of Modern Cosmology – which aimed to present and discuss new 
developments concerning methodological, conceptual, epistemological and 
metaphysical issues in modern cosmology. A basic characteristic of the workshop was 
the stimulating interchanges between historians and philosophers of science and 
observational and theoretical cosmologists. The papers in the present volume are the 
written outcome of this event. 
 
Broadly speaking, the philosophy of cosmology is concerned with the foundational and 
philosophical assumptions and consequences of cosmological theories and observations. 
This includes philosophical issues surrounding the ‘ingredient theories’ of cosmology; 
first of all general relativity, but also cosmological implications or uses of quantum 
mechanics, quantum field theory and thermodynamics. Systematic surveys of the 
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philosophical aspects of modern cosmology are practically inexistent. The few possible 
exceptions to this include the overview articles by Ellis (2007), Smeenk (2013), and 
Ellis (this volume). The recent dates of these overviews bear witness to a currently 
rising interest in the philosophy of cosmology, and the fact that they are so few in 
number suggests that there is still much ground to be covered. 
 
The papers in the present volume of course reflect the particular and different interests 
of the authors, and they cannot be taken to constitute a systematic survey of the field. It 
is to be hoped, nevertheless, that these papers may serve as inspiration for further 
exploration and mapping of the philosophical territory of cosmology. In the following, I 
provide a brief outline of the contents of the papers before closing with a few remarks 
on the current interest in philosophy of cosmology. 
 
The volume opens with George Ellis’ overview of some fundamental issues in 
philosophy of cosmology. These include the demand to, and scope of, explanations in 
cosmology, the implications of the limits of our observational access to distant domains 
of the universe, and the possible tests of alternative models and of consistency within 
the standard cosmological model. The paper provides a spirited defense of the relevance 
of philosophy for cosmological thought by one of cosmology’s main practitioners. This 
is brought out clearly e.g. in Ellis’ discussion of the uniqueness of the universe and of 
the multiverse – an attempt to deny this uniqueness. Regarding the multiverse, Ellis 
argues that its advocates unjustifiably invoke physically existing infinities and 
undermine the most important criterion for what constitutes genuine science – namely 
observational and experimental support (cf. also Kragh’s contribution). A particular 
concern for Ellis is the scope of cosmology as a science. As he points out, one may in 
physical cosmology restrict attention to more technical issues regarding e.g. fits 
between theory and observation or modes of argumentation. On the other hand, if one 
expects cosmology to have a deeper impact on the way we see ourselves in the world – 
a sentiment often reflected in the titles, or at least on the back-flaps, of popular 
cosmology books – then one has to go into a very different territory where much more 
than physics is involved. Ellis argues that in this latter case one must take on the relation 
between cosmology and such big and open-ended issues as emergence of complexity, 
meaning, purposeful action and ultimate causation.  
 
Dominico Giulini’s paper is also concerned with the scope of cosmology, though in a 
quite different sense from the way this is addressed by Ellis and Kragh. While the 
multiverse discussion is often about a possible upper limit – or “outward bound” – for 
when cosmology is a science, Giulini addresses a possible lower limit – or “inward 
bound” – for when and for what objects cosmological (expansion) effects are relevant. 
Giulini’s attack on this question is to investigate how the global expansion affects local 
physics. He first argues that the often invoked idea of expansion as a stretching of space 
is misleading. Rather, cosmological expansion is best thought of in terms of changes in 
the inertial structure of space, that is, as geodesics deviating from one another. Giulini 
shows how such a notion of expansion can be captured in a simple pseudo-Newtonian 
picture – as an extra term in Newton’s second law (akin to what is done when rewriting 
this law for non-inertial reference frames). These considerations lead to the conclusion 
that gravitationally bound systems roughly below the scale of galaxy clusters (20-30 
Mpc) do not expand as their gravitational binding force is larger than the ‘expansion 
force’. The intuitive form of this Newtonian picture is later justified in the context of 
general relativity. Giulini finally takes up the difficult subject of how to describe the 
possible effects of expansion on objects such as black holes which require a full general 
relativistic treatment. Expansion may change the mass and horizon structure of a black 
hole but the issue is complicated since there is no natural way to superpose solutions (or 
interpolate spacetimes) in general relativity. 
 
A conceptual discussion of the question of time in relativity and cosmology is presented 
in the paper by Marc Lachièze-Rey. He argues that no coherent notion of time – which 
unites the main characteristics usually attributed to time – can be found once we move 
to Einsteinian relativistic physics. While this claim is not novel, Lachièze-Rey 
illustrates his case with an interesting analogy between the change from Aristotelian to 
Newtonian physics (in which the vertical is given up) and the change between 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physics (in which time is in some sense given up). The 
discussion of the different aspects of time in relativity builds up to a discussion of the 
notion of cosmic time. Contrary to standard presentations of this topic, Lachièze-Rey 
rejects the usual way of introducing cosmic time via solutions to the Einstein equations 
which satisfy the cosmological principle, that is, the assumption of homogeneity and 
isotropy of the spatial sections.  (For a different problem with this procedure, see Rugh 
and Zinkernagel 2011). Lachièze-Rey instead discusses a definition according to which 
cosmic time at an event is the supremum of all the proper durations of all future directed 
time-like curves ending in this event. While Lachièze-Rey points out that such a notion 
is not always well-defined (that is, finite), he argues that this definition is preferable 
when dealing with the real cosmological situation in which the universe is, of course, 
not perfectly homogeneous and isotropic. In any case, cosmic time is only one among 
several relevant, but mutually contradictory, choices for a time-function in cosmology – 
none of which, argues Lachièze-Rey, can be identified with time as such. 
 
The following two papers address general epistemic issues in modern cosmology. Helge 
Kragh’s contribution is on a possible epistemic shift in contemporary cosmology 
brought about by the ongoing discussion of the scientific status of multiverse proposals. 
An epistemic shift would involve changing the standard criteria for when a theory or 
model can be considered scientific – the most widespread such criterion being 
Popperian falsifiability. The main reason for claiming such an epistemic shift is the 
well-known problem that the multiverse may be untestable – or at least non-falsifiable – 
insofar as the other universes are in principle unobservable. Kragh places this problem 
in a historical context by showing a number of examples where cosmologists have 
argued for or against changing the rules of science in connection with new theoretical 
ideas. In the present day context, all cosmologists agree that testability is an 
indispensable and central criterion for cosmology as a science. Nevertheless, Kragh 
provides an informative discussion of how many different notions of testability are 
actually in play in the cosmological literature. As a consequence, Kragh shows that 
cosmologists are divided on the question of how (and at what stage in theory building) 
testability should be applied, and even what this criterion exactly means. 
 
Jeremy Butterfield is concerned in his paper with various aspects of underdetermination 
in cosmology. He argues that cosmology in this regard is different from other sciences 
in that possible data in cosmology is limited to those of the Earth’s past light-cone (as 
opposed to observable events anywhere in spacetime), and that underdetermination in 
cosmology is often about models, e.g. solutions of general relativity, rather than of 
underlying theories. This situation implies that the underdetermination of cosmological 
models is endemic: Butterfield discusses theorems which affirm that in most general 
relativistic spacetimes, we simply cannot gather sufficient data to observationally 
determine whether we live in one spacetime or another. Breaking this  
underdetermination requires making assumptions about the whole of spacetime, for 
instance by asserting the validity of the cosmological principle. However, Butterfield 
reviews the possible reasons for expecting this principle to hold outside our past-light 
cone and finds them lacking. Moreover, even the establishment of the cosmological 
principle within our past light-cone (the observable universe) is to some extent 
debatable. Butterfield concentrates his discussion on the more established parts of the 
cosmological standard model, from about 1 second after the Big Bang (the onset time of 
nucleosynthesis) to now. In the last section, he takes up the possible justification for the 
cosmological principle coming from the very early (inflationary) universe. As 
Butterfield hints, however, at best one may explain a feature of the late universe by 
invoking speculative physics (e.g. the conjectural inflaton field) at very early times. 
 
The observational situation in present-day cosmology is addressed from three very 
different perspectives in the papers by Hamilton, López-Corredoira and Falkenburg. 
Jean-Christophe Hamilton gives a detailed account of the observational basis and status 
of the hot Big Bang model – in its currently favored version known as the Lambda Cold 
Dark Matter model – which is consistent with the widespread sense of correctness of the 
Big Bang picture. Yet, as Hamilton points out, triumphalism on behalf of the Big Bang 
is not in order. For there are still dark clouds on the horizon, most notably the well-
known questions concerning the unknown origin and nature of dark matter and dark 
energy. Both of these elements, which are crucial to the matter-energy budget being 
consistent with a wide range of observations (in particular the WMAP results), are 
embarrassing from a theoretical point of view. Moreover, Hamilton points to some less 
well-known problems threatening the consistency between observations and Lambda-
CDM predictions: The Lithium-7 problem which concerns a too low observed 
abundance of this isotope with respect to nucleosynthesis predictions, problems in 
accounting for some galactic scale dynamics, as well as possible anomalies in the 
Cosmic Microwave Background radiation. Nevertheless, in Hamilton’s view, the overall 
agreement between the Lambda-CDM model and a wide range of increasingly accurate 
observations is very impressive. Thus all of the mentioned problems should be seen as 
important motivations for further investigations of the model rather than signs of defeat. 
 
Martín López-Corredoira takes a rather more skeptical view on the observational 
situation. In his contribution, he first gives an informative overview of alternative 
cosmological models, including the quasi-steady state theory, plasma cosmology, static 
(or eternal) models, and a number of variations on the standard Big Bang model. To the 
extent these models are even considered by the majority of cosmologists, they are 
usually taken to be observationally ruled out. However, given that the Big Bang model 
also has its problems – and López-Corredoira gives a long list of such problems – things 
might not be that easy. In López-Corredoira’s view, a plausible explanation for why the 
Big Bang model currently does better than its alternatives is simply that these 
alternatives are less developed than the former. This highly controversial claim – which 
amounts to a radical form of underdetermination in cosmology – rests on the idea that 
ad hoc additions may be invoked to make a model fit the cosmological data in case of 
conflict. The following sections contain a personal account of possible sociological 
factors – including groupthink and censorship in the electronic archives – which might 
affect the consensus opinion on the superiority of the Big Bang model. While López-
Corredoira insists that he is not defending a social constructivist perspective and that 
there are objective data in cosmology, his paper is unmistakably polemical, and one 
referee felt that the paper was overly biased against standard cosmology. Nevertheless, I 
think the paper is important since it expresses a sentiment which is not often heard, and 
which should not be forgotten when discussing the philosophical and foundational 
aspects of modern cosmology.  
 
In her paper, Brigitte Falkenburg takes up yet a different aspect of the observational 
situation in cosmology, namely the role of astroparticle physics. This field broadens the 
empirical basis of cosmology by taking into account also the information coming from 
cosmic rays – often analyzed in underground laboratories by particle physics methods. 
In Falkenburg’s view, it is still not obvious precisely in what way this rather new 
discipline contributes to cosmology. In any case, she argues, astroparticle physics is 
philosophically interesting in that it challenges standard philosophy of science views e.g. 
of scientific explanation and realism. In particular, astroparticle physics pursues a 
‘bottom-up’ approach in which models of the cosmic sources are constructed from data, 
and the study of subatomic particles are hoped to be informative about the large-scale 
structures of the universe. This contrasts with the ‘top-down’ approach of cosmology, 
more in line with standard views on explanation in philosophy of science, in which one 
proceeds from theory to data and from ideas of the large scale structures of the universe 
to their small scale observable consequences. Falkenburg points out that astroparticle 
physics pursues different heuristic unifying strategies – consistent with the fact that no 
unified theory of sub-atomic particles and their cosmic sources is known. This leads to 
an interesting combination of causal realism about the cosmic sources together with 
instrumentalism, or temporary ignorance, concerning the specific causal mechanisms 
giving rise to the observed spectrum of cosmic rays.  
 
The last two papers concentrate on inflation and its consequences for early-universe and 
multiverse cosmology. Robert Brandenberger argues in his paper that inflation is not the 
well-established theory that it is often taken to be. Both because inflation still has 
several unresolved conceptual problems and because viable alternatives for theories of 
the early universe exist. The latter issue is yet another instance of underdetermination in 
modern cosmology. Brandenberger presents two scenarios – matter bounce and string 
gas cosmology – which, like inflation, may account for the origin of the structure in the 
universe, as observed in terms of inhomogeneities in the distribution of galaxies and 
small amplitude anisotropies in the cosmic microwave background radiation. Regarding 
the conceptual problems for inflation, Brandenberger pays special attention to the trans-
Planckian problem for cosmological perturbations. The problem is that the prediction 
from inflation of the origin of structure depends on there being physical length scales 
smaller than the Planck length at the onset time of inflation, and so this prediction may 
well be sensitive to currently unjustified assumptions regarding unknown (quantum 
gravity) physics. This problem does not arise in the alternative models presented, 
although Brandenberger points out that these models have conceptual problems of their 
own. One will therefore have to make some sort of trade-off regarding strength and 
weaknesses of inflation and its competitors but, in any case, Brandenberger is confident 
that observations will be able to tell them apart in due time. 
 
While Brandenberger questions the case for inflation by presenting alternatives, Chris 
Smeenk addresses the issue of how much weight can be put on the shoulders of 
inflationary cosmology, assuming that inflation indeed gives a roughly correct picture of 
the early universe. In particular, Smeenk asks whether inflationary cosmologists are 
entitled to draw far reaching conclusions concerning the existence of a multiverse. It 
transpires from Smeenk’s discussion that typical arguments in favor of the multiverse, 
based on anthropic considerations, are hard to sustain, as they are based on a number of 
questionable ‘ifs’: Only if we could somehow count the elements of an infinite 
ensemble of pocket universes (the measure problem), and if we could then justify the 
introduction of probabilities, and if anthropic predictions could discriminate between 
competing theories, then one might come up with a prediction lending support to the 
multiverse. There is a remaining ‘if’, touched upon in the end of the article, which is the 
assumption that inflation actually leads to a multiverse. In fact, anthropic considerations 
regarding the multiverse have been invoked as a possible response to the fine-tuning 
problem for inflation (which holds that inflation needs more finely tuned parameters for 
the inflationary potential, than those of the fine-tuning problems inflation was originally 
meant to solve). The trouble is, as Smeenk points out, that this strategy may well 
undermine the motivations which led people to inflation in the first place, as one might 
use anthropic considerations to explain the cosmological fine-tuning (flatness and 
horizon) problems directly without inflation. In this case, the above mentioned problems 
of making anthropic predictions in support of the multiverse reappear as problems of 
making anthropic predictions in support of adequate initial conditions for our universe.  
 
Before closing this introduction, let me come back to the above mentioned currently 
rising interest in the philosophical aspects of cosmology. Several possible reasons may 
be given for this. For instance, widely studied and open questions in philosophy of 
physics such as the nature of space-time, the possible unification in science, and the 
ramifications of various proposals for a quantum theory of gravity all find common 
ground within the philosophy of cosmology (see e.g. Ellis 2007). Moreover, cosmology 
is one of few scientific disciplines in which scientists openly and currently discuss 
philosophical issues, for example concerning the very nature of science itself. In 
addition, one could point to a reason which is not particularly new, although much 
exploited in contemporary popular writings on science: There seems to be something 
intrinsically fascinating about the cosmological questions, and they command a 
considerable public interest. In my view, this relates to another worthwhile 
philosophical aspect of cosmology – namely aesthetics – which is barely treated in the 
papers included here (see however Ellis’ section 8).   
 
Aesthetic considerations are by no means foreign to cosmology. ‘Kosmos’ in Greek may 
refer to order, adornment – as in ‘cosmetics’ – and also an orderly universe. As we know 
from Pythagoras, cosmology in this sense started out as the science of the harmonious 
and the beautiful; the science of a finite and well-ordered cosmos. Later on, and not 
least in the work of Giordano Bruno, the idea of an infinite universe entered the 
cosmological scene. In 1757, British philosopher Edmund Burke pointed out that the 
infinite is a main source for the aesthetic category known as the sublime.
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 And so, 
cosmology could be seen also as the science of the sublime; the science of uncountable 
island universes extending towards infinity. No wonder, then, that cosmology has 
always had such a strong aesthetic appeal.  And, if we are to believe Burke and the 
power of the infinite, no wonder that the multiverse idea is so attractive to many modern 
day cosmologists. On this point, Bersanelli (2011) makes an interesting observation. An 
infinite universe is not automatically aesthetically attractive. If the spatially infinite is 
merely an indefinite repetition of what is already known, it might well stop to surprise 
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boring in the end: “Nothing really happens in a world where everything always goes on 
infinitely often… It seems that spatial infinity, in order to be perceived as a fascinating 
concept, has to maintain some kind of element of selected variety and genuine surprise” 
(Bersanelli 2011, 205). 
 
In any case, as also testified by the papers in this volume, there are no reasons to 
become disillusioned with modern cosmology. We do not know, and probably cannot 
ever come to know, whether the universe is in fact infinite. More generally, given 
principled limitations on possible data, if not those stemming from our own finitude, 
cosmological knowledge will always be incomplete. Thus cosmology and its 
philosophical study can safely be expected to keep offering surprises. 
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